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Introduction 
 
Gross National Happiness (GNH) has only recently appeared 
on the international stage,2 yet it was immediately met with 
sympathy by scholars, political activists, and politicians 
around the world. What is the reason for this strong appeal of 
this concept? 
 
In a historical perspective, the reason is probably a 
disillusionment with the broken promise of economic growth 
to truly improve people’s lives and bring about a more 
equitable society. After a multifold increase of Gross National 
Product in many societies thanks to almost continuous 
economic growth over more than a century, even the 
wealthiest societies are still plagued by grave social problems 
like unemployment, child poverty, stress etc., and they are 
disappointed that the hoped-for benefits of economic growth 
largely failed to materialize. 
 
In a philosophical perspective, however, the reason for the 
sympathy extended to GNH seems to be based on an - 
intuitive or conscious - ethical endorsement of GNH as being 
                                                 
1 I am grateful for valuable comments by the members of the 
“Berliner Forum” on a first conceptual draft of this paper and for 
suggestions by Peter Ulrich on section six. All remaining errors are 
my own.  
* Johannes Hirata is currently attending the Institute for Business 
Ethics at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland.  
2 Apparently the most conspicuous occasion at which GNH was 
presented to a wider audience outside Bhutan was the address by 
His Excellency the Prime Minister, then Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley to the Millenium Meeting for Asia 
and the Pacific in 1998 (Thinley 1999). 
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conducive to good development, with “good” understood in a 
comprehensive, ethical sense. This implies that in order to 
endorse GNH, one must already have a normative frame of 
reference that allows one to make such a judgment in the first 
place.  
 
The question that arises then is if GNH is, or can be 
conceptualized as, an exhaustive concept of good 
development that entirely fills in the ideal notion of good 
development, or whether GNH is just one aspect of good 
development that has to be complemented by additional 
normative concepts in order to appropriately substantiate the 
idea of good development. 
 
Whatever the answer to this question, the merit and the 
potential of GNH to serve as a development concept is worth 
being investigated. To do so, the meaning of GNH has to be 
specified since no generally accepted interpretation seems to 
exist. This is not only a disadvantage of course as this 
conceptual openness invites a constructive debate on what 
GNH should stand for and how it should be operationalized. 
These two - essentially ethical - questions will be at the center 
of discussion in this paper. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section will 
discuss the nature of happiness and its relation to human 
behavior and decision making in order to shed light on the 
relationship between happiness and ethics. I will then briefly 
present my understanding of (deontological) ethics, before 
examining the relationship between happiness and economic 
growth on the basis of empirical evidence. I will then propose 
a particular interpretation of GNH and relate it to the concept 
of good development. Towards the end, I will point out some 
implications of my interpretation of GNH for its 
operationalization before I synthesize the main arguments 
into five succinct statements in the conclusion. 
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Happiness, Human Behavior, and Ethics 
 
At least since Thomas Hobbes, the belief that people’s 
behavior and choices are motivated ultimately and exclusively 
by the desire to experience a maximum of happiness has 
gained wide currency not only in the social sciences but in 
popular wisdom as well. In economics, this belief in 
“psychological hedonism” has been particularly influential 
and practically became the anthropological basis of economic 
theory as a whole. As a deterministic model of human 
decision-making, it allows economists to subject human 
behavior to rigid, quantitative analysis. 
 
While I shall not concern myself much with the peculiarities 
of economic theory, I will use psychological hedonism as a 
reference point to clarify my understanding of happiness and 
of its connection with ethics. 
 
Happiness 
Even though every language seems to have a word for 
happiness or satisfaction and people from all cultures 
apparently have no difficulty understanding its meaning - 
albeit with slightly different nuances - the idea of happiness 
defies a precise definition. Depending on context and 
perspective, happiness may be understood in a variety of 
ways. For the purpose of this paper, a distinction between an 
empirical and a normative concept of happiness appears 
appropriate. 
 
The empirical concept of happiness falls into the domain of 
psychology where the term “subjective well-being” (SWB) has 
been coined to describe an individual’s subjective, self-
reported overall happiness as expressed along a one-
dimensional scale. To preempt the most frequent source of 
mistaken skepticism, it is crucial to appreciate the meaning 
of the attribute ‘subjective’. It means that SWB really is the 
unquestioned perception of each individual himself taken at 
face value, rather than a normative concept of “actual well-
being”. When it is stated, for example, that the SWB of person 
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A is higher today than it was yesterday, this does not - at 
least not necessarily - mean that this person is actually faring 
better today than he was yesterday (i.e., “faring better” in a 
normative sense of ‘quality of life’). It does mean, however, 
that he judges his well-being more favorably today than he 
did yesterday.3 SWB alone, therefore, does not suffice to tell 
us how happy an individual is in an absolute, moral sense (in 
the remainder I will refer to this as “actual well-being” or as 
“the happiness we actually value”). SWB is not meant to 
replace such ethical concepts as eudaimonia (Aristotle 1998), 
the good life, or quality of life  (Nussbaum & Sen 1993). Of 
course, it is plausible to suppose that SWB is closely 
correlated with “actual well-being.” Indeed, once SWB data 
are interpreted in a specific context, one may find compelling 
arguments for specific conclusions about “actual well-being”. 
As long as one is looking at raw data, however, SWB should 
simply be taken at face value, namely a subject’s statement 
on her perceived degree of well-being. In this sense, subjective 
well-being is a fairly objective concept. While the data 
themselves rely on subjective assessments by the respective 
respondents, the methodology is perfectly objective and 
independent of any researcher’s personal evaluations. 
 
As a normative concept, on the other hand, happiness 
requires not only an instantaneous positive mental 
experience, but also the reflected approval of its propriety by 
the respective person herself in the presence of all relevant 
information. Happiness in this sense will be called “happiness 
that is actually valued”, or “valued happiness” for short, and 
it is to be understood as a judgment. To illustrate what this 
entails, consider the thought experiment of a happiness 
machine that can give you pure and unlimited pleasure for an 
arbitrarily long period (Nozick 1989).4 What is more, this 
                                                 
3 A case where reported happiness and actual quality of life 
obviously diverge in this sense is the case of Olympic silver medal 
winners who on average report lower SWB than bronze medal 
winners (Schwarz & Strack 1999: 67). 
4 This idea is no pie in the sky anymore. In the brain of rats, a 
pleasure center could be identified which, when stimulated 
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machine generates not just dull pleasure but the perfect 
illusion of happiness. The person connected to this machine 
will experience a perfect illusion of friendship, love, good 
music, delicious food etc. and will actually believe to be happy 
for these reasons, completely unaware of being locked into 
that machine. There would be no negative side-effects of 
using this machine and its use would not imply any costs, 
nor would it be addictive.  
 
Imagine a person uses the machine while mourning the death 
of a friend. Even if, while using the machine, he forgets about 
his friend’s demise and experiences pleasure, we certainly 
would not call this person happy because the happiness we 
actually value is more than the sensation as such. Happiness 
is inseparable from the particular reason that makes us feel 
happy (Spaemann 1989: 41, 73) and in this sense it is not an 
end that is achieved through means (which would not have 
any intrinsic value) but rather a symptom that indicates that 
a person has some intrinsically valuable reason for being 
happy. When we are happy for a friendship, for example, we 
do not only care about the effect this friendship has on our 
psychic well-being, but also and primarily about the 
friendship itself as the reason for our happiness. Similarly, we 
do not only want to experience love, we want to actually be 
loved - and we even hate to experience love that is just 
pretended. Put differently, we do not only want the pleasure 
generated by the feeling to be loved, we also want this love to 
be genuine, to actually be the case (Nozick 1989: 106). In the 
same vein, someone who finds out about her husband’s 
infidelity is not unhappy for having discovered it but for his 
being unfaithful. In short, the sensation of happiness is not 
separable from its underlying reason. The event that makes 
                                                                                                       
electronically, makes the rats show all symptoms of pleasure, and 
this effect does not wear off over time. The rats even neglect food 
while being in such a state. Technically, the same effect could be 
exploited in human beings, as seriously advocated by Ng (1997: 
1849) who sees the promise of “increasing our welfare by a quantum 
leap.” 
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me feel (un)happy is not the substitutable cause of my 
happiness but its irreplaceable content (Spaemann 1989). 
 
Understanding happiness this way does not mean to look 
down upon spontaneous pleasure for the sake of an 
“intellectualized” concept of happiness. Pleasure, which I 
understand here as an immediate, pre-reflective positive 
mental experience (such as enjoying tasty food, listening to 
music one likes etc.), is in itself valuable and needs no moral 
justification. Nevertheless, for pleasure (as a pre-reflective 
experience) to become happiness, (as a judgment), the person 
must at least not morally disapprove of the experience she 
finds pleasurable - a vegetarian, e.g., might stop enjoying his 
food when he discovers that it contains meat, even though he 
would otherwise enjoy the taste. 
 
The distinction between the empirical concept of happiness as 
SWB and the normative concept of happiness as “valued 
happiness” is best understood as a distinction between a 
solipsist and a self-transcendental perspective. In the solipsist 
perspective, the person cares only about his inner mental 
states as recorded in some pleasure center within his brain 
and is entirely indifferent with respect to both (i) the reasons 
that bring about these inner mental states and (ii) anything 
that does not become part of his experience (and hence does 
not influence his inner mental state). Such solipsism is in fact 
the distinguishing feature of hedonism in general (not only 
psychological hedonism as a specific hypothesis). In the self-
transcendental perspective, by contrast, a person is seen as 
caring also about (i) and (ii) and as in this sense transcending 
his self. 
 
Linking Happiness with Ethics 
The link between happiness and ethics can be thought of as 
twofold, making a distinction along the lines of the classical 
separation between teleological ethics - basically the “private” 
questions of the good life, of who I want to be and how I want 
to live - and deontological ethics - the “social” question of 
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legitimacy, of one’s rights and duties vis-à-vis other moral 
subjects. 
 
Psychological hedonism, to take up my point of departure, 
supposes a very mechanical relationship between happiness 
and ethics. With respect to teleological ethics, it says, first, 
that happiness is the only thing that counts when it comes to 
choosing who one wants to be and how one wants to live, 
and, by implication, that the things from which a particular 
person derives happiness are predetermined by nature and 
therefore beyond this person’s own will. To use economic 
terminology, a person is assumed to simply have, rather than 
choose, a consistent set of preferences that provide the 
algorithm to calculate, in any given situation, the optimal 
decision, i.e., the decision that will maximize her happiness.5 
The kind of rationality involved here is purely instrumental 
rationality, i.e., it is a matter of optimization with respect to a 
given end. 
 
With respect to deontological ethics, the deterministic nature 
of psychological hedonism renders the very idea of rights and 
duties meaningless because one cannot sensibly demand 
from predetermined beings (which resemble a clockwork more 
                                                 
5 Two likely objections to this account of utility maximization can be 
anticipated. First, economists are sometimes reluctant to identify 
utility with happiness. In the context of the present argument, 
however, the precise meaning of utility is irrelevant. It is identified 
with happiness simply for the sake of terminological consistency, to 
avoid introducing redundant terms. Second, some economists 
propose a distinction between ordinary preferences and meta-
preferences and claim that it is not necessary to make any 
assumptions on the origin of meta-preferences, i.e., whether these 
are predetermined or chosen. Yet, while this distinction may be a 
useful heuristic device to separate instrumental and volitional 
rationality (more on this below), it cannot be maintained on a more 
fundamental level because it is logically impossible to derive 
deterministic outcomes (in this case: decisions) from an 
indeterminate basis, unless further artificial assumptions are made 
(such as a rigid temporal separation between an indeterminate and a 
deterministic phase of life). 
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than a person) to behave in another way than that which they 
are programmed to follow, the reason being that morality as 
such requires indeterminacy of human behavior. In general, 
therefore, whether others are affected by one’s choices or not, 
psychological hedonism claims that an individual’s decisions 
are always and exclusively the deterministic manifestation of 
one’s preferences, whatever these happen to be. Thus, 
psychological hedonism subscribes to a solipsist conception 
of the person and does not know the concept of morality. 
 
In a self-transcendental perspective, by contrast, the 
teleological question of the good life is not a matter of 
maximization. In this perspective, it is strictly impossible to 
maximize happiness, even if it was proclaimed as one’s 
strategy, because people simply do not from the outset 
dispose of a given set of preferences. Rather, they have to 
choose and continuously reaffirm, or revise, their preferences 
without knowing which selection of preferences will leave 
them happiest. Having no pre-established set of preferences, 
there is no way they can optimize their choice. Instead they 
will have to decide by virtue of their free will, i.e., by volitional 
rationality, which preferences they consider worth having. 
This is pretty much what people colloquially mean when they 
say that they have to decide what they really want. This 
choice is in a fundamental sense indeterminate and 
unpredictable and, by its very nature, cannot be explained in 
the same causal way as decisions of instrumental rationality. 
Furthermore, in terms of deontological ethics, the very idea 
that people are so dominantly motivated by a concern for 
being happy (or avoiding unhappiness) seems to be overly 
rigid and far removed from our everyday experiences. For 
example, economists typically explain the phenomenon that 
people spend effort and time in order to cast their vote in 
political elections, despite knowing that their vote will make 
virtually no difference to the overall outcome, by a motivation 
to avoid the pain of a bad conscience that would result from a 
good citizen’s failure to vote. This argument, however, raises 
the question why somebody who failed to vote would have a 
bad conscience, and why she would want to be a good citizen 
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in the first place. Why would such a person not just get rid of 
this “preference for voting”, given that she does not benefit 
from it anyway? An economist might continue assuming the 
presence of some higher-order preferences, but ultimately 
would have to concede that he can only assume, but not 
explain, the presence of such preferences. In a self-
transcendental perspective, by contrast, voting would be 
explained - to the extent it is explainable - by an intrinsic 
motivation to act in accordance with those moral principles 
which one has found to be irrefutable. Of course, living up to 
these principles will most often be a reason for a person to 
feel satisfied, but then only as a symptom of one’s successful 
commitment to one’s principles, rather than its cause or 
motivation (cf. above p. 82). Or more generally, as Frankl 
(1978) put it: rather than seeking happiness, we seek a 
reason to be happy, and the more we directly chase after 
happiness rather than after a reason for happiness, the more 
we get removed from it. “Happiness cannot be pursued, it 
must ensue” (Frankl 1978: 288). 
 
Defenders of psychological hedonism might claim that this 
postulate is entirely speculative and cannot be falsified (and 
hence would not qualify as a scientific theory in the sense of 
Popper [1959/1934]). Such critics would be perfectly right 
with this claim, but should not overlook that the same is true 
for psychological hedonism as well, and in fact for any 
anthropological decision theory. One simply cannot do 
without such speculation when theorizing about human 
behavior. What I attempted to show is merely that the 
speculative assumptions of psychological hedonism have little 
plausibility because they imply that people are completely 
determined and have no free will, while the - equally 
speculative - assumptions of the self-transcendental 
conception of behavior are closer to our self-perception as 
autonomous persons who act upon reasons rather than being 
pushed around by causes.  
 
To the degree people have a free will, then, they can actually 
choose different preferences than those they actually hold at 
Journal of Bhutan Studies 
 108
a given point in time.6 To be sure, human beings cannot 
choose their preferences entirely arbitrarily. The natural 
liking of sweet and distaste for bitter tastes, for example, can 
apparently not be reversed at discretion. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be some scope to choose our preferences - we can, 
so to speak, learn to like our coffee with or without sugar. 
When our preferences are not just about the sugar in our 
coffee but about things that affect other people, this is where 
deontological ethics comes in. A murderer, to illustrate this 
point with an extreme example, must be acquitted by the 
defenders of psychological hedonism because, in their view, 
his lethal preferences were forced upon, rather than chosen 
by, him (through his genetic disposition and environmental 
influences). When it is believed that human beings have a free 
will, however, he can be held responsible for not having 
chosen more benign preferences (or for having failed to 
contain his wicked preferences), because he could have 
refrained from killing; there was nothing, in particular no 
preference map, that forced him to kill. Positively speaking, a 
socially responsible person will, in this view, act responsibly 
not in order to feel good. Rather, she will feel happy because 
her successful living up to her moral principles and her 
sharing in the happiness of others are reasons for her to feel 
so, and this is so because she has come to accept these moral 
principles as irrefutable. Why she has adopted these 
benevolent principles while others have not done so may 
partly be due to education, socialization etc., but ultimately 
remains a matter of an indeterminate free will and is therefore 
beyond complete causal explanation. 
 
Two major conclusions follow from these considerations: first, 
that individual well-being is not a static function ingrained in 
human nature but an ultimately free judgment dependent on 
the values and preferences a person has chosen. This implies 
- as is also supported by empirical happiness research - that 
                                                 
6 I continue using economic terminology for the sake of cross-
disciplinary communication, even though it does not do full justice 
to the phenomena discussed. 
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favorable life circumstances are just a necessary, and not 
sufficient, condition for happiness and that happiness 
ultimately springs from a human mind. “Happiness is not 
something that happens to people but something that they 
make happen” (Csikszentmihalyi 1999). 
 
Second, the human capacity to make free decisions entails 
the duty to make only such decisions that are legitimate. 
Among free individuals, others always are entitled to demand 
from me a revision of my preferences if these, or rather the 
actions they engender, violate their respective rights. Taken 
together, this means that a society - or a government, or a 
family - should not see as its aim the promotion of happiness 
for its own sake (e.g., by distributing feel-good pills), but 
rather the creation of conditions and the transmission of 
values that allow people to find legitimate reasons for 
happiness. 
 
Ethics: the Moral Point of View 
  
The previous references to ethics raise the question of what 
exactly is understood here under such concepts as ‘morality’, 
‘legitimacy’, ‘rights’, and ‘duties’. In what follows, I will give a 
rough indication of my understanding of deontological ethics - 
i.e., the legitimacy dimension of ethics, leaving aside the 
teleological dimension of ethics for the moment - which is 
rooted in discourse ethics as developed by K.O. Apel and 
J. Habermas. For a more elaborate treatment the reader is 
referred to the relevant literature.7 
 
Systematically speaking, deontological ethics is the scientific 
discipline that reflects on morality and the possibility of the 
universal validity of moral principles. Morality, in turn, is the 
specific, disinterested attitude that submits the pursuit of 
one’s personal interests, which is not immoral as such, to the 
categorical condition of legitimacy. This attitude is only 
                                                 
7 Cf. Apel (1973) and Habermas (1983). For a discourse ethical 
conception of economic ethics cf. Ulrich (1998b,1998a). 
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genuinely moral when it is adopted out of a disinterested 
recognition of the dignity of other persons, rather than out of 
the calculated expectation of a personal advantage. 
Legitimacy is warranted when one’s behavior conforms to 
norms that are universalizable, i.e., norms that can in 
principle be accepted by everyone.8 Put differently, a choice is 
legitimate when it can be justified before all those potentially 
affected by its consequences. This justification can be 
thought of as a universal approval by an unlimited 
communicative community (Habermas 1983: 99). 
 
This criterion of legitimacy is not to be understood as 
requiring a factual consensus in a real discourse. Rather, it is 
meant as a regulative idea, i.e., an ideal type situation that 
merely provides the “moral point of view” (Baier 1958), rather 
than a “social technology” that generates solutions to moral 
problems (Ulrich 1988a: 11). This lack of concreteness may 
be criticized, but then this very lack is a characteristic of 
ethics itself and merely reflects its indeterminacy, and the 
feat of discourse ethics of having developed a firmly reasoned 
moral point of view must not be underestimated. In fact, any 
ethical theory offering a deterministic ethical formula that can 
always tell right from wrong would promise more than may, 
and should, be expected.9 
 
In short, morality thus understood is not about altruism or 
selflessness. Rather, it requires that one voluntarily 
subordinates one’s interests and actions to the criterion of 
legitimacy by ensuring that one respects the rights of all 
others in one’s pursuit of one’s interests. Seen from another 
                                                 
8 This idea of universalizability has most prominently been 
expressed by Kant in his Categorical Imperative (Kant 1977/1785: 
51, 62), even though the essence of this idea is much older, going 
back at least to the “Golden Rule” that can be found in a variety of 
holy scriptures. 
9 “The idea that there is a book in heaven that contains the answers 
to all moral problems seems as naïve as the fear that, in the absence 
of such a book, everything becomes arbitrary.” (Tugendhat 1995: 
332). 
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angle, it requires that the norms of one’s behavior be 
universalizable in the sense that they can be accepted, or 
enjoyed, by everybody equally. 
 
Under this view, what is right and wrong depends ultimately 
on people’s free judgment of what they find justifiable or 
rejectable, and therefore on their free choices. Consequently, 
a moral discourse, even an imaginary one, is not merely a 
means to find a pre-existing moral solution that is just 
waiting to be discovered like the solution to a mathematical 
equation. It is rather through the discourse itself that it is 
established what is and is not legitimate. After all, the very 
act of taking a genuine interest in others’ rights - a 
characteristic of any discourse worth its name - is itself 
constitutive of, though not sufficient for, moral actions. 
 
Providing merely a formal principle defining the moral point of 
view, rather than a catalogue of norms or values, discourse 
ethics seems to be less vulnerable to accusations of culture-
dependence. In fact, for an objection against discourse ethics 
- whether voiced from within a culture or out of a different 
cultural context - to be an objection at all, i.e., to be a 
reasoned critique rather than a mere statement, it has to 
invoke precisely those norms that are explicated by discourse 
ethics. The only way to escape this “forceless force” 
(Habermas 1981: 47) is to refuse the discourse altogether 
which would identify the speaker as a moral fundamentalist 
who thereby places himself outside the moral community. 
Except for such fundamentalist convictions, however, 
discourse ethics indeed seems to describe the proper, 
universal “moral point of view” irrespective of cultural 
specificities. 
 
Happiness and economic affluence 
 
Empirical happiness research has produced a remarkable 
body of evidence on the relationship between economic 
affluence and happiness. Yet, except for a few neat results, 
the overall picture is rather heterogeneous and difficult to 
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interpret.10 In a nutshell, what has become clear is that, 
within any given society with some degree of income 
inequality, the poorest 20 or 30 percent are significantly less 
happy (in terms of SWB) than the upper 70 or 80 percent of 
the income distribution. It is also well-documented that at a 
given point in time, rich nations tend to be more happy than 
poorer ones, even though this seems to be true only up to 
some threshold level in the order of magnitude of US$10,000 
annual per capita income, and even far below this value one 
finds positive outliers with levels of happiness that are also 
found in very rich countries. On the other hand, there is little 
evidence that nations become happier as they get richer over 
time. While there are virtually no data for developing 
countries - which limits the potential for generalization - the 
data series coming closest to witnessing the escape from 
poverty is that of Japan beginning in 1958, which shows no 
significant upward trend over more than thirty years.11 
 
Three major effects can explain the bulk of these 
observations. First, the happiness deficit of the poorer 
segments within a society and the failure of average SWB to 
rise with average incomes are to a large extent due to a 
“secondary inflation” effect (Hirata 2001: 36) that reduces the 
value, in terms of “functionings” (Sen 1980/1983), of a given 
consumption level (i.e., a level that is constant in terms of a 
representative basket of goods) as a society grows richer. For 
example, growing car ownership often leads to a deterioration 
of public transport services which means that those people 
whose real incomes fail to rise with those of the majority will 
end up being worse off (i.e., in terms of the functioning of 
mobility), and that the possession of a car partly reflects a 
new necessity rather than the satisfaction of a genuine desire.  
                                                 
10 Cf. Hirata (2003: 10ff) for the sources of the following claims. For a 
comprehensive discussion of methodological and other issues in 
happiness research cf. Kahneman, Diener & Schwarz (1999). 
11 A more recent study found some evidence for a positive time-series 
effect (Hagerty and Veenhoven (2003), but as argued in Hirata (2003) 
some of their calculations seem to be wrong. 
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More fundamentally, the functioning of social participation 
depends to a substantial degree on relative income. 
Socializing is simply more expensive in rich societies than in 
poor ones, and it may be doubted whether the additional 
money spent on social activities buys an increase in 
happiness. “In a poor society a man proves to his wife that he 
loves her by giving her a rose but in a rich society he must 
give a dozen roses” (Layard 1980: 741). 
 
Second, people appear to get used to the new comforts 
brought about by rising consumption standards, but they 
frequently fail to anticipate this “hedonic adaptation” 
(Loewenstein & Schkade 1999). As a consequence they spend 
money on goods that have only a temporary effect on 
happiness, and too little on goods that would yield lasting 
happiness. Empirical evidence for hedonic adaptation is 
overwhelming (Loewenstein & Schkade 1999). 
 
Third and most important in this context, on a social level 
consumption is largely a zero-sum game in terms of 
happiness.12 Even in the case of consumption goods that are 
not subject to hedonic adaptation, their happiness effect may 
be annihilated as soon as others can afford the same good. 
This is either because the increase in demand leads to 
congestion effects (e.g. holidays on a remote beach) or 
because the source of satisfaction consists precisely in being 
ahead of the crowd (e.g. the satisfaction from having a 
superior social status). To the extent consumption takes place 
in such a competition for “positional goods” (Hirsch 1976: 11), 
individually rational decisions will result in a socially wasteful 
allocation of resources, just as standing on tiptoe in a theater 
will improve each one’s view individually but not lead to a 
better view for the audience as a whole. As Hirsch (1976) and, 
more recently, Frank (1999) convincingly argue, positional 
competition is a pervasive phenomenon in affluent societies. 
                                                 
12 Hirsch (1976) provides a brilliant analysis of this effect and is the 
basis for the following discussion. 
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However, despite these three effects, some hope remains. Not 
all ways of spending money are subject to the secondary 
inflation effect, hedonic adaptation, or positional competition. 
Relief from the stress of driving through dense traffic, regular 
physical exercise, noise abatement, and freeing up time to 
socialize with friends are empirically confirmed examples for 
transforming resources into happiness that neither wears off 
over time (at least not entirely) nor depends on relative 
position (Frank 1999: 81ff).13 
 
On the whole, the evidence on the relationship between 
wealth and happiness strongly suggests that it is not 
governed by a mechanical quantitative law, but that it is 
above all the quality and not the quantity of consumption 
that has an impact on how satisfied a society is. To be sure, 
SWB requires at least the satisfaction of life-sustaining needs 
and certainly some degree of material comfort beyond that. 
Yet, this still leaves a large range of income levels and 
consumption standards that offer the potential, but no 
guarantee, for pervasive happiness. 
 
Nothing of this is to say that economic growth is per se 
undesirable. In a modern market economy operating on 
international markets, a failure to grow at the same pace as 
one’s trading partners will most likely be associated with 
rising unemployment which in turn breeds unhappiness. It 
would miss the point, though, to propose a stimulation of 
economic growth in order to contain unemployment because, 
depending on the perspective adopted, economic stagnation 
can be seen as either the cause or the consequence of 
unemployment. In the latter perspective, a reduction of 
unemployment will automatically result in economic growth 
whenever technological progress takes place. The point is that 
focusing on economic growth is less plausible as a policy 
objective (at least for affluent economies) than focusing on 
reducing unemployment. When confronted with a choice 
                                                 
13 Strikingly, almost all examples concern the alleviation of problems 
typical of affluent societies. 
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between (a) stagnating GNP but full employment or (b) rising 
GNP but stagnating high unemployment (which would, for 
example, result from an extension of the work week), 
empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the former 
will be more conducive to SWB. 
 
Gross National Happiness and good development 
 
The recognition that economic growth is not per se a good 
thing has lead people to look for concepts that would better 
reflect human betterment. As a result of the ecological 
awakening in the early 1970s, attempts were made to adjust 
GNP for unaccounted costs in terms of lost natural capital 
and negative external effects, e.g., those caused by noxious 
fumes, on the quality of life. Being more concerned about 
poverty, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
designed the Human Development Index (HDI) that integrates 
GNP, longevity, and literacy data into a single figure. Both 
initiatives were, and continue to be, important correctives to 
the obsession with GNP, but, as will be argued below (0), they 
remain deficient because they remain committed to a one-
dimensional (utilitarian) concept of good development.14 
 
A much more profound shift of perspective was made by His 
Majesty the IV King of Bhutan when he declared Gross 
National Happiness to be the primary, though not exclusive, 
principle of the country’s development efforts without forcing 
that idea into a quantitative index. Since then, and especially 
since GNH has risen to international awareness, GNH has 
found many advocates. What these advocates claim is not 
merely that GNH should be adopted in order to achieve, say, 
happiness, i.e., if happiness happens to be one’s goal, but 
their claim is that GNH should be adopted because it is a 
better development concept, full stop. In other words - in 
Kant’s words actually - they do not make a hypothetical claim 
                                                 
14 Some proponents of such single-index indicators recognize this 
deficiency but justify their use by their strategic value (Sen 1999). 
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but a categorical one (Kant 1977/1785: 43), and this means 
they are making an ethical statement. 
 
To make such a statement, and to arrive at a favorable 
comparison of GNH vis-à-vis competing concepts (such as 
GNP), one must as a matter of logical necessity have some 
comparison criteria, some normative frame of reference which 
provides orientation between good and bad, right and wrong, 
just as a compass does between North and South. In the 
context of societal development, this frame of reference is 
implicit in the notion of good development. This is of course 
only a formal concept, a point of reference providing 
orientation and must not be mistaken for a concrete objective, 
or a utopia, that is to be accomplished. Similar to the ideal 
concept of a geometrically perfect circle that only exists as an 
idea and can never be found in the real world, good 
development stands for a criterion, a regulative idea, rather 
than for an objective. Different from a circle, however, it 
cannot be completely defined. As an ethical idea it is even 
ultimately indeterminate just as ethics itself (cf. p. 89). Hence, 
rather than being a weakness, this elusiveness of good 
development is just consistent with its role as representing 
the idea of the good itself. 
 
When I talk about development in this context, this is not to 
be understood merely as the process of eradicating hunger 
and abject poverty in the so-called “developing countries” and 
neither as the economic catching up of these countries to the 
consumption levels of the high-income countries, but rather 
as the never-ending effort of all societies to narrow the gap 
between the actual and the potential goodness of social 
arrangements and of the well-being of citizens. With this 
understanding of development, all countries are and will 
always be developing countries. 
 
For good development to deserve its name, it must also be 
justifiable in a temporal and in a global perspective. It must 
not only be concerned with the people currently living in a 
given society, it must also take into account the rights of 
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future generations (temporal perspective) and those of other 
societies (global perspective). This is of course not an 
additional requirement but merely the consequent 
generalization of the idea of universalizability. Having said 
this, my intention is merely to flag these two dimensions as 
worth bearing in mind, but I will not be able to discuss them 
explicitly within the scope of this paper. 
 
So far and to my knowledge, the concept of GNH is defined 
only to a limited extent, namely by the four major goals of (1) 
economic self-reliance, (2) environmental preservation, (3) 
cultural promotion, and (4) good governance (Thinley 1999: 
16). Moreover, it is usually seen as one principle next to 
others, not as the only principle of development, as expressed 
in the famous phrase by His Majesty the King, “Gross 
National Happiness is more important than Gross National 
Product” (Thinley 1999: 12-13) (rather than saying that GNH 
is the only objective of importance).15 And of course the term 
“happiness” speaks for itself and thereby fills the concept of 
GNH with substance, but again with some scope of 
interpretation as there is no universally accepted concept, let 
alone definition, of happiness. 
When going about to conceptualize GNH in what follows, I will 
therefore take as a starting point the following assumed 
consensus on the meaning of GNH: 
 
• GNH comes with a moral claim to be conducive to 
good development. 
• GNH is an (incomplete) catalogue of goals and 
priorities, with the four major objectives (as 
mentioned above) as its goals and with happiness as 
the first priority. 
• GNH is not an ethically inclusive concept, i.e., it is 
not in itself sufficient to substantiate the idea of good 
                                                 
15 In a recent government document, however, it is, unfortunately, 
suggested that happiness should be maximized (Planning 
Commission 1999). 
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development, but needs to be complemented by other 
principles. 
 
Apparently, GNH is essentially about allowing people to live 
well and to be happy. In philosophical terms, therefore, it is a 
teleological concept, one that is concerned with what is good 
(as opposed to right or just). Good development, however, 
must integrate the teleological perspective of the good life with 
the deontological perspective of legitimacy, otherwise it will 
remain incomplete. Put differently, good development not only 
needs a conception of what constitutes a good life (happiness, 
for example), it also needs principles that provide criteria to 
decide what is right when the good life, or the happiness, of 
one person conflicts with that of another. For example, if of 
two neighbors one finds happiness in silence and the other in 
listening to loud music, the principle of happiness does not 
provide any orientation of how this conflict of interest should 
be dealt with. 
 
In fact, there is a school of moral philosophy, namely 
utilitarianism, that does claim exactly this, that the criterion 
of happiness can also decide questions of legitimacy. In the 
principle of total utility maximization, utilitarianism claims to 
dispose of a criterion that tells right from wrong: maximizing 
utility is right, anything falling short of utility maximization is 
wrong. In the example of the two neighbors, the volume 
should (not may, but should!) be turned up as long as the 
increase in the music lover’s happiness is larger than the loss 
in his neighbor’s happiness. (Of course these happiness 
increments cannot be precisely measured, but this can be 
regarded as a practical limitation of all moral criteria and no 
particular deficiency of utilitarianism.) Looking closer, 
however, it is evident that it is not happiness itself that 
provides the criteria of right and wrong, but the principle of 
maximization together with some more or less natural 
premises. 
 
This principle is problematic for at least three reasons. First it 
must presuppose that people have rather than choose their 
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preferences (cf. p. 85). If, by contrast, people are assumed to 
have a free will, happiness maximization is simply not 
possible as a matter of logic - one cannot deduce determinate 
results from an indeterminate basis.16 
 
Second, following directly from the rejection of a free will, 
people cannot be held accountable for their preferences. 
Imagine a poacher who would be prepared to pay a large 
amount of money to a community to be allowed to shoot the 
remaining snow leopards in their forests to take their furs 
home as trophies. Happiness maximization would demand 
that the poacher should be allowed to hunt down the snow 
leopards if the resulting total happiness rises as a result 
(ignoring the (un)happiness of the snow leopards of course). 
When people find this way of settling conflicts of interest 
outraging, it is because they do not, as utilitarianism does, 
take a person’s happiness as given and as beyond critical 
reflection. They would contend that the poacher can and 
should revise his preferences and that he should derive 
happiness from more benign purposes - and that otherwise 
he deserves to be denied that source of happiness even if that 
reduces the sum total of happiness.17 
 
Third, people obviously care about more than happiness 
alone. For example, when a person forgoes an opportunity for 
personal happiness in order to honor a promise even though 
that does not bring her any significant benefit, then this 
person puts commitment before happiness (Sen 1983). Saying 
that commitment is also a source of happiness and enters 
into her hedonistic calculus would again assume that the 
person has not herself chosen to want to commit herself, but 
that she just happens to have a preference for commitment. 
                                                 
16 Cf. footnote no. 5. 
17 This implies that this kind of conflict is not merely a matter of 
negative externalities. In fact, I would contend that the 
questionability of preferences discussed here demarcates the limit to 
the internalization of external effects and, on a more fundamental 
level, constitutes the blind spot of economics with respect to 
deontological ethics. 
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This kind of reasoning, however, would bereave the idea of 
commitment of its very essence - and the person of her 
personality. 
 
Rejecting happiness maximization is of course not the same 
as rejecting happiness as one policy objective among others 
embedded into a larger concept of good development. In 
particular, I would like to propose an interpretation of GNH 
where happiness fulfills two distinct roles: one as a 
teleological substantiation of good development, and the other 
as a heuristic device. 
 
In its first role, happiness substantiates the formal concept of 
good development by specifying what it should primarily be 
about. In particular, it gives priority to mental well-being, to 
positive sentiments, and to a positive evaluation of one’s life 
to the degree these concepts are implied by the idea of 
happiness. In other words and recalling what has been said 
above about the nature of happiness, it focuses on allowing 
people to have reasons for contentment and happiness. While 
there are certainly some rather universal characteristics of 
happiness, each culture may give varying weights to the 
different aspects of happiness and emphasize additional 
qualities that would be part of a culture-specific 
understanding of happiness. In a Buddhist tradition, e.g., 
individual enlightenment, control of one’s desires, and 
freedom from excessive self-concern (Thinley 1999: 17-18) 
would perhaps play a central role. Singling out such a 
conception of happiness as a development priority contrasts 
with the traditional Western development paradigm which 
was driven by a deep-rooted ethos of industrious thriftiness 
that has been famously attributed to the “Protestant Ethic” by 
Max Weber (1975/1920). 
 
The importance of a society’s development paradigm, I would 
argue, seems to lie not primarily in its direct influence on 
political decisions, but in the impact it has on people -
whether ordinary citizens or politicians - as an orientating 
principle. It provides or legitimizes rationales people invoke in 
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designing institutions, in the reflection on their values, and 
even in their everyday decisions. At least, many decision 
rationales in the affluent Western societies seem difficult to 
explain if not by the prominence of GNP as the epitome of 
good development.18 
 
In its second role, happiness can serve as a heuristic device 
within the concept of GNH to elucidate the subtle 
psychological and societal phenomena that drive a wedge 
between what people actually want and what eventually 
results from their decisions (as discussed above). Knowledge 
of these phenomena may allow the individual to make less 
decisions he will have to regret (because he fell into some 
psychological trap), and it may allow society to contain 
prisoners’ dilemmas by instilling in citizens a sense of 
collective interdependence, making the need for commitment 
to social norms more plausible to the individual. 
 
In either of these roles, GNH does not, and should not, play 
its role as a “user manual” for decision makers, but rather as 
a mental ferment that leads to better informed and more 
thoroughly reflected choices, private and collective, and as a 
proclamation of a societal consensus of value priorities that 
lends authority to the “soft” argument in favor of happiness. 
Thereby, happiness should enrich the deliberative process 
that should be taking place anyway, and in which decisions 
should be taken by the conscientious assessment of reasons 
rather than by maximizing a happiness function. 
 
The relationship between good development and GNH is 
therefore one between a formal principle and its concrete 
meaning in a specific context in which people identify with a 
particular ethos. By giving substance to the concept of good 
                                                 
18 Lane, e.g., posits that “the market culture teaches us that money 
is the source of well-being,” and that people, “lacking privileged 
knowledge of the causes of their feelings, … accept conventional 
answers” (Lane 2000: 72). 
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development, it may be argued, GNH is itself already the first 
step of operationalizing good development. 
 
Operationalizing Gross National Happiness 
 
Even though GNH is more substantive than the formal 
concept of good development, it remains a rather ideal 
concept. Hence, if one wants to fix the way it is translated 
into consistent decision rationales that can be applied to 
concrete situations,19 GNH needs to be further 
operationalized. In fact, GNH has already been 
operationalized to some degree by the specification of the four 
major goals mentioned above, but it remains unclear - at 
least in the literature I am aware of - through which ordering 
principles these goals relate to each other. In the first part of 
this section, therefore, I will try to delineate one possible 
ordering principle by examining the economic-liberal stance 
that good development, and perhaps happiness, consist 
primarily or even exclusively in letting people choose 
individually for themselves free from collective restrictions 
and without questioning their choices. After laying out my 
objections against this view, I will propose an alternative 
maxim as the basis for operationalizing good development 
and will then revert to the four major goals of GNH. In the 
second part of this section I will briefly discuss the role 
indicators should play in the operationalization of GNH. 
 
Liberty and Happiness 
Proponents of the economic-liberal position basically make 
two distinct arguments. First, they posit that freedom of 
choice is of intrinsic value, i.e., valuable independent from the 
consequences this freedom has on welfare. Second, they 
believe that economic theory and common sense justify a far-
reaching trust (i) in each individual’s ability to make those 
                                                 
19 This is how I understand the title of this seminar. While GNH has 
all along already been translated into concrete decisions by 
Bhutanese decision makers, I understand that its operationalization 
seeks to spell out and fix the way this translation ought to be done 
in order to warrant some degree of coherence. 
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choices that are in her best interest, and (ii) in an “invisible 
hand” (Adam Smith) that transforms uncoordinated 
individual choices into social welfare. 
 
(1) Regarding the first point, it should be noted that saying  
something to be of intrinsic value is not the same as 
saying that something has to be protected whatever the 
cost. For example, I may consider animals to possess 
intrinsic value, yet still approve of hunting for the purpose 
of keeping animal populations in balance if the killing of 
some animals is justified by reference to some other 
intrinsic value of more weight (such as the long-term 
survival of the biotope). I could not, however, approve of 
hunting just for the fun of it because, in my view, hunting 
as a source of fun can perfectly be substituted by other 
activities that do not require to compromise on intrinsic 
value. In the language of Immanuel Kant, saying that 
something is of intrinsic value would mean that it shall 
“always at the same time be treated as an end and never 
only as a means” (Kant 1977/1785: 61), but not that it 
may never and under no circumstances be also put in the 
service of another purpose of intrinsic value. In the 
context of free choice this means that I can acknowledge 
the intrinsic value of free choice, yet at the same time 
advocate selective limits to free choice where this is 
justified by other intrinsic benefits I consider more urgent. 
 
(2) Regarding the second argument, I shall raise three more 
or less related objections against an unlimited trust in 
individual rationality and the invisible hand. 
 
(a) First, individuals appear to make systematic mistakes 
in predicting which choice will make them happiest. In 
addition to the well-established phenomenon of hedonic 
adaptation (cf. p. 92), I will propose an argument by 
Norberg-Hodge (1991) that can be labeled the “seduction 
by modernity”-hypothesis. Since her argument is based 
on anecdotal evidence and can therefore not be 
generalized, I will merely propose it without being in a 
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position to defend it as a general phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, considering that she has closely witnessed 
the entire process of modernization in Ladakh - a region 
in North-West India which appears to share some 
important characteristics with Bhutan, at least until just 
a couple of decades ago - her narrative might be of 
relevance to the challenge of good development faced by 
Bhutan. 
 
Her argument basically is that the first contact with 
modern lifestyles by people in traditional societies, most 
often through the presence of Western tourists and 
television, instills an immense admiration of the 
achievements of modernity while concealing the 
downsides of economic progress. 
 
“For millions of youths in rural areas of the world, 
modern Western culture appears far superior to their 
own. It is not surprising since, looking as they do from 
the outside, all they can see is the material side of the 
modern world—the side in which Western culture excels. 
They cannot so readily see the social or psychological 
dimensions—the stress, the loneliness, the fear of 
growing old. Nor can they see environmental decay, 
inflation, or unemployment. On the other hand, they 
know their own culture inside out, including all its 
limitations and imperfections.” (Norberg-Hodge 1991: 97-
98)  
People see the convenience of time-saving appliances - 
but not that competition for productivity increases the 
pace of life. They see that by earning money they can 
afford valued goods - but not that monetization threatens 
to undermine social relationships (cf. also Rhodes 2000). 
They see that work in the modern sector is less strenuous 
- but not that a sedentary lifestyle makes people prone to 
obesity and diseases of civilization. They see that a good 
education increases the chances of their children to get 
high-paying jobs - but not that widespread schooling will 
separate children from their parents and, if based on 
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Western curricula, will alienate them from their own 
culture (cf. also Wangyal 2001). 
 
I hasten to emphasize that I am not implying that 
traditional life is always and in all respects better than 
modern life. Norberg-Hodge herself also acknowledges 
that modernity brings improvements too. Rather, the 
point is that people in traditional societies may have a 
biased perception of modern life, clearly seeing its 
blessings, but largely ignoring its dark sides. This may to 
some extent be due to a lack of information, but also to a 
systematic bias inherent in cognitive processes. For 
example, people typically fall prey to the “focusing 
illusion” (Schkade & Kahneman 1998), overstating the 
satisfaction they will derive from a specific change in their 
life simply because their attention is drawn to this 
particular life domain. By highlighting this bias in 
perception, I do not say that people should always decide 
against modern lifestyles, but merely that people’s 
decisions would better serve their authentic interests if 
the less visible effects of modernization were also 
appreciated. 
 
(b) My second objection concerns the trust in the 
efficiency of a benevolent invisible hand. To be sure, the 
market mechanism is often a highly efficient way to 
organize production and allocate goods, and there are 
good reasons to make use of this mechanism for the 
purpose of good development. However, to the degree 
people compete for positional goods and thus engage in a 
zero-sum game (cf. p. 113), the invisible hand may turn 
counterproductive. In this case, the market mechanism 
will lead a society to spend real resources on relocating 
goods among people (generally from those with little to 
those with much capital - intellectual, physical, or 
monetary), rather than on a net creation of value. From a 
social perspective, this is as wasteful as if, say, ten 
percent of theater visitors could buy the privilege to stand 
up during the performance. As theater visitors get richer, 
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they would bid up prices without making any difference 
to the overall outcome. The analogy between society and 
the theater audience only breaks down in terms of 
membership: you can simply choose not to go to the 
theater, but you do not have that choice with respect to 
society.20 
 
(c) My third objection concerns the trust in the justice of 
the invisible hand. Even though economic liberalists 
sometimes concede that the invisible hand is not perfectly 
just, they contend that its deficits in terms of justice are 
unimportant enough to be outweighed by its efficiency 
benefits. This view, I believe, is grossly inadequate. 
Rather, the invisible hand is better described as being 
indifferent towards matters of justice - it may lead to 
largely just outcomes under favorable conditions, but it is 
not by itself just. The main reason for this is that it hands 
out the economic product to each according to his 
bargaining power, which is defined largely in terms of the 
relative scarcity of a person’s skills. A talented athlete, 
e.g., can accumulate sufficient money for the rest of his 
life before the age of twenty - provided his talent is 
relatively scarce (both in terms of supply of, and demand 
for, his talent). A construction worker, on the other hand, 
will in his whole life not earn the equivalent of a world-
class soccer player’s annual salary, even if he is the most 
diligent and skillful worker - simply because his skills are 
not scarce enough since there are (too many) others 
around who could replace him. The observation that this 
                                                 
20 Another limitation to this analogy consists in the flow of the 
money spent on positional goods. While in the theater example, the 
seller of the privilege - say, the municipality - would simply earn a 
pure rent so that the money is just transferred and not received as a 
compensation for work, the money spent on positional goods in real 
life is often lost in the sense that it is spent on real work that creates 
only individual, but no social value (as is typical in cases of “rent 
seeking”). Examples for this would be advertising; preparatory 
courses for university entry exams; the purchase of status symbols 
such as luxury watches etc. 
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effect tends to reward effort - an essential demand of 
distributive justice - and leads to efficiency-enhancing 
incentives for people to develop valued (i.e., scarce) skills 
may justify a degree of distributive injustice, but it does 
not grant an all-out absolution from a concern for justice. 
Rather, markets with their efficiency-enhancing 
properties should be put in the service of a normative 
conception of good development and, consequently, find 
their limits where they lead to a degree of distributive 
injustice that can no longer be justified. In other words, 
justice should be a matter of moral criteria that 
determine the domain and the form of the market, not the 
other way round. 
 
The criticism raised here against the economic-liberal view is 
in fact a criticism at a specific economistic (Ulrich 1998b: 15) 
interpretation of liberalism which reduces the idea of freedom 
to “freedom of choice” in the sense of protecting people from 
intrusion into their individual choices (“negative freedom”). 
Another reading of the idea of freedom, by contrast, would be 
“freedom to choose”, namely to choose a dignified, fulfilling 
way of life (“positive freedom” or “real freedom”). In this 
interpretation, freedom may not only require protection from 
undue intrusion, but also the active empowerment of the 
disadvantaged to enable them to actually choose a dignified 
way of life, rather than condemning them to make do with 
whatever the economy happens to leave for them. 
This republican-liberalist (Ulrich 1998b: 295) view differs in 
at least three important respects from the economic-liberal 
one: 
 
(i) First, it does not take for granted that people will always 
make choices that are in their best interest. Neither, 
however, does it seek to prescribe, or even enforce, 
specific choices or values (an ambition economic 
liberalists are fond of imputing to any alternative to their 
own position). It merely includes the formation of 
preferences and choices into its field of interest by asking 
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for the conditions which enable people to actually make 
choices that are in their best interest. 
 
(ii) Second, and this is the specifically republican element of 
this conception of liberalism, it expects from all citizens to 
enjoy their freedoms as responsible members of a res 
publica (from Latin for “public affair”). In contrast to 
economic liberalism which seeks to isolate the individual 
from moral obligations and attempts to justify this by 
hinting to the efficiency of an ideal economic order, 
republican liberalism expects from each citizen a 
commitment to the res publica, i.e., the willingness to 
subordinate one’s private interests to the condition of 
public legitimacy (Ulrich 1998b: 299). More concretely, a 
republican citizen would not, e.g., recklessly take full 
advantage of her superior bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
economically disadvantaged - even where the conceivably 
best economic order legally entitles her to do so. 
Moreover, she would not regard this as a constraint to 
her freedom, but rather as naturally following from her 
identity as part of the res publica. She simply would not 
want to benefit unduly at the expense of others. In other 
words, each citizen is called upon to regard economic 
interaction not as a space free of morality but as part of 
the moral space that includes all human interaction, and 
to treat the other members of society not as opponents in 
a bargaining contest but as co-citizens of a shared res 
publica and as moral subjects which are to be respected 
in exercising one’s own freedom. 
 
(iii) Third, republican liberalism considers restrictions on 
individual choices to be justified when these restrictions 
are themselves the manifestation of free choices, i.e., 
when they are democratically legitimized. For example, 
the wide-spread practice of mandatory pension saving 
schemes is obviously a restriction on people’s choices, 
but it is a restriction most people advocate in order to 
collectively control their spending behavior which they 
apparently feel would otherwise not be in their best 
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interest. Put differently, a populace can voluntarily 
choose to put in place restrictions on their choices 
without becoming an illiberal society for that reason. 
 
The concept of republican liberalism does not imply any 
specific design of the economic order and of people’s liberties. 
Rather, it conceives of freedom in a positive mode rather than 
merely as the absence of interference, and argues that 
people’s choices need to be preceded by a fundamental 
reflection in two dimensions. In the individual dimension, the 
reflection should consist in a critical examination of one’s 
preferences in the light of the full consequences of different 
development paths. There can be little doubt, e.g., that 
parents’ choices with respect to their children’s education will 
be better after they have examined the “seduction by 
modernity”-hypothesis, no matter if that examination actually 
changes their choices. In the social dimension, the reflection 
should consist in a public moral discourse about the legal 
and institutional provisions that are most conducive to good 
development. A truly liberal society may prefer to impose 
some constraints on freedom of choice in order to give people 
freedom to choose and in order to avoid wasting resources on 
positional rat races, rather than, in blind trust in the 
benevolence of an invisible hand, deliver people to the 
vagaries of unfettered competition. 
 
Of course, people can usually be assumed to already reflect 
on the wider implications of their choices without needing 
instruction to do so. However, important aspects of one’s 
choices’ consequences - especially when leading to an entirely 
novel way of life - may simply not be obvious and will 
therefore not be adequately taken into account. Furthermore, 
it would be naïve to assume an unlimited human capacity to 
cope with fundamental social change. Here, governments can 
play the role of stimulating the circulation of balanced, or 
(counter-)balancing, information; encouraging reflection on 
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specific issues; facilitating public discourse; and 
strengthening initiatives of civil society (Galay 2001).21 
 
Coming back now to the four major goals of GNH: economic 
self-reliance, environmental preservation, cultural promotion, 
and good governance, the question arises how these rather 
specific goals relate to the concept of republican liberalism 
that has been proposed here as an ordering principle for the 
operationalization of the concept of GNH. 
 
First of all, a crucial distinction should be made between the 
nature of concrete goals and ethical principles. While goals 
may be better or worse, more or less important, and may be 
achieved in good or bad ways, ethical principles are neither 
good or bad (because a bad ethical principle is no ethical 
principle at all), but rather right or wrong (i.e., more or less 
well-argued). In other words, while goals are the objects of 
ethical judgments, ethical principles provide the moral point of 
view from which to make these judgments. Both are 
complementary, of course: While goals remain devoid of value 
unless they are evaluated by means of ethical principles, 
ethical principles have merely formal character until they are 
related to concrete goals (cf. the distinction between the 
teleological and the deontological perspectives above on p. 
118). Thus, the four major goals of GNH may serve the 
purpose of emphasizing certain issues of particular 
importance, but they need to be complemented by 
(deontological) ethical principles that provide the criteria to 
judge, e.g., to which degree economic self-reliance shall be 
pursued; at which cost to human well-being the environment 
should be preserved; or how far cultural promotion may go in 
constraining individual liberties.22 For the task of operation-
                                                 
21 I should reemphasize that I am making general remarks here 
without implying that deficits of this sort are present in Bhutan.  
22 The fourth goal, good governance, has an intermediate role 
between goals and ethical principles because the attribute “good” 
already implies a claim to having the quality of an ethical principle 
(after all, “good governance” is by definition good and therefore need 
not be evaluated). Including it in the list of major goals may 
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alizing the concept of GNH, this means that the ultimate 
point of reference from which to evaluate the 
operationalization of GNH is not the concept of GNH itself, 
but again an inclusive ideal concept of good development. 
Happiness may be the paramount objective in this conception 
of good development, but it must also always remain 
embedded in the latter. 
 
Another way of focusing attention on specific aspects of good 
development is the selection of appropriate indicators, which 
shall be explored in the following sub-section. 
 
Measuring Happiness? 
The apparent allusion of the expression “Gross National 
Happiness” to the conventional concept of “Gross National 
Product” suggests that now “happiness” should be measured 
in Bhutan just as “product” is measured in most other 
countries. One would simply have to take the average of the 
population’s SWB scores in order to arrive at a “per capita 
GNH”-indicator that would replace the indicator of “per capita 
GNP”. Recent advances in the methodology of happiness 
measurement, one might argue, would warrant a sufficient 
degree of precision and validity. A substantial minority of 
Kuensel online readers seem to agree: in a recent poll 
(December 2003), 36 percent (n=439) answered in the 
affirmative when asked whether “GNH, a developmental 
philosophy, [can] be economically quantified.”23 
 
A likely candidate for the quantification of happiness is of 
course the concept of subjective well-being (p. 101) since it 
rests on a firm empirical methodology. Yet, while SWB would 
certainly be a better indicator than GNP because it is about 
an intrinsically and not only instrumentally valuable 
objective, any single-index “super indicator” of social well-
                                                                                                       
nevertheless be justified in order to emphasize the importance of this 
particular ethical principle. 
23http://www.kuenselonline.com/pollBooth.php?op=results&pollID=
63&mode=&order=&thold= 
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being, no matter if GNP, SWB, HDI (p. 115), or yet another 
concept, will be reductionist in that it reduces a multi-
dimensional and indeterminate judgment to a single, 
ostensibly objective figure. More often than not, once an 
indicator has come to be recognized as the highest-order 
indicator of good development, it soon is identified with good 
development itself and its maximization elevated to the 
ultimate objective. Such a view quickly transforms a perhaps 
sensible rule of thumb (“raising indicator X tends to be good”) 
into an unquestioned doctrine (“good development consists in 
raising X”). The indicator in question then becomes the 
substitute of conscientious deliberation, rather than its 
content. In the case of GNH, a particular risk consists in the 
possibility that the concept of GNH one day comes to be 
appropriated by a hedonist (i.e, solipsist; cf. p. 104) and 
utilitarian understanding of happiness, in which case the 
original spiritual and moral dimension of GNH would be lost. 
 
In operationalizing GNH one should therefore perhaps refrain 
from formulating a single-index indicator and instead rely on 
a variety of separate indicators that capture various aspects 
of people’s daily lives that are much more relevant to good 
development, and in particular to happiness, than is GNP. 
Examples for such indicators would be malnutrition, health, 
mental depression, suicide, youth delinquency, alcoholism, 
drug abuse, and divorce rates, just to name a few. Such a 
heterogeneous (i.e., not aggregated) set of social indicators 
would underscore the view that even the most meaningful 
indicators provide just inconclusive pieces of information 
which need to be evaluated along moral criteria and cannot 
replace moral deliberation. This is all the more evident in the 
context of sustainability and global justice. A steep rise of 
happiness indicators, for example, will have to be assessed 
very carefully when it is based on unsustainable trends or on 
the exploitation of other countries. In short, to make sense of 
social indicators, they always need to be embedded into a 
wider moral discourse. 
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The deliberate selection, and propagation, of social indicators 
seems to be more than an academic ivory tower-exercise. 
Casual observation suggests that those indicators that 
dominate newspaper headlines, TV news, and education 
curricula have a tremendous impact on both political and 
private priorities. If European newspaper headlines were 
dominated by indicators of subjective well-being, child 
poverty, and divorce rates, instead of by GNP and Dow Jones 
trends, the political agenda and presumably even private 
priorities might be a bit more concerned with qualitative 
rather than with quantitative development. By analogy, if the 
concept of GNH is properly specified and continues to be the 
guiding principle - but not the doctrine - of Bhutan’s 
development vision, it can play an invaluable role in 
positioning the right indicators into newspaper headlines and 
thereby directing public discourse and private concerns 
towards those aspects of life that are constitutive elements of 
good development. 
 
There is nevertheless a strategic case for the formulation and 
publication of a single-index indicator since it is so much 
more convenient to communicate, especially across mass 
media, and so much more effective in catching people’s 
attention. Realistically reckoning with the role of mass media 
and politicians’ perceived need for simple messages, one must 
therefore assume that highest-order indicators of good 
development will always remain in circulation. The question 
then becomes not what would be the perfect indicator, 
because that would mean the rejection of any candidate, but 
which indicator would be less inappropriate than the 
incumbent top-indicator in most minds, which currently is 
GNP. To topple GNP and replace it with a more humane 
indicator, therefore, one needs to look for “a measure … of the 
same level of vulgarity as GNP - just one number - but a 
measure that is not as blind to social aspects of human lives 
as GNP is,” as the spiritual father of the HDI, the former 
UNDP director Mahbub ul Haq, demanded (Sen 1999: 23). If 
one rejects a crude single-index measure of happiness 
because it is not perfect, one may end up with an even worse 
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indicator. The challenge is to catch attention with a single-
index indicator and at the same time highlight its deficiencies 
so as to stimulate a moral discourse on the content of 
happiness within a comprehensive concept of good 
development. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Happiness seems to provide an especially promising 
perspective to approach the challenge of development facing 
Bhutan. By adopting Gross National Happiness as its 
overarching development concept, Bhutan speaks out loud in 
favor of a people-centered perspective on development. 
In this paper I have made a number of diverse points, and I 
shall conclude by synthesizing them into five statements. 
 
(i) Happiness is inseparable from the reasons for happiness. 
In contrast to the means/end metaphor where happiness 
is the only end of intrinsic value and all other objectives 
have merely instrumental value, happiness should be 
seen as a symptom indicating that a person has reason to 
be happy. In this perspective, the person cares not only 
about his positive mental experience but also about the 
reasons themselves which are of intrinsic value. 
 
(ii) Happiness is something people make happen. 
If we recognize that people have a free will, it follows that 
happiness is only to some extent dependent on objective 
life circumstances. Ultimately, people can be happy or 
unhappy in a large variety of settings. A person can be 
happy with her material possessions either because she 
has much or because she desires little. Thus, to attain 
happiness, it would be foolish for a society to focus 
exclusively on life circumstances and neglect the inner 
foundation for happiness. Bhutan’s Buddhist heritage 
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might be a particularly strong source for instilling, or 
preserving, a foundation of this kind.24 
 
(iii) Gross National Happiness is a substantiation of the ideal 
concept of good development. 
An approval of GNH is always made by implicit or explicit 
reference to the regulative idea of good development. 
Being a formal concept, good development needs to be 
substantiated by more specific concepts if it shall guide 
decisions, and happiness may be an especially 
appropriate candidate to serve as such a concept. 
 
(iv) Good development is more than Gross National Happiness. 
As a teleological concept, happiness does not entirely fill 
out the formal concept of good development. In particular, 
it fails to address the dimension of legitimacy, i.e., it does 
not provide any criteria of how to deal with conflicts of 
interest. It therefore has to be complemented by 
deontological ethical principles 
 
(v) Good development consists in giving people freedom to 
choose rather than freedom of choice. 
Economic liberalism propagates the maxim that good 
development consists in protecting people’s freedom of 
choice. They fail to see, however, that people’s free 
choices may be more or less informed and better or worse 
reflected. Furthermore, a society may decide to restrict 
people’s freedom of choice in order to enhance people’s 
freedom to choose, without therefore becoming an illiberal 
society. In this view, the economy should not be left to 
take care of itself, but rather be embedded into society. 
                                                 
24 This does not mean that only Buddhists recognize the importance 
of inner attitudes. It was the classic utilitarian John Stuart Mill who 
said, “I regard any considerable increase of human happiness, 
through mere changes in outward circumstances, unaccompanied 
by changes in the state of desires, as hopeless; ...” (Mill 1969/1833: 
15). 
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Its efficiency potential should become the servant of 
development rather than its purpose. 
 
Gross National Happiness makes a valuable first step towards 
operationalizing the notion of good development by selecting 
as the prime goal of development human well-being rather 
than material opulence. It is exactly in this role that the 
concept of GNH is particularly well positioned to be put in the 
service of good development. 
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